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PRIVATE ORDERING AT THE WORLD'S
FIRST FUTURES EXCHANGE

Mark D. West*
INTRODUCTION
Modern derivative securities - financial instruments whose value
is linked to or "derived" from some other asset - are often sophisti
cated, complex, and subject to a variety of rules and regulations. The
same is true of the derivative instruments traded at the world's first
organized futures exchange, the Dojima Rice Exchange in Osaka,
Japan, where trade flourished for nearly 300 years, from the late sev
enteenth century until shortly before World War II. This Article
analyzes Dojima's organization, efficiency, and amalgam of legal and
extralegal rules. In doing so, it contributes to a growing body of litera
ture on commercial self-regulation1 while shedding new light on three
areas of legal and economic theory.
First, unlike participants in many other studied markets, Dojima
traders did not opt out of the legal system. Like other parties to dis
crete transactions in early modern Japan, Dojima traders were forced
out by the shogunate government. Although participants operated in
the shadow of latent state regulation, the government remained
largely hands-off by, most importantly, denying legal enforceability of
futures contracts. The distinction between opting out of and being
forced from the legal system is more than historical curiosity. In a re
cent article, for instance, Lynn Stout argued in the context of modern
over-the-counter derivative markets that private ordering can be supe
rior when parties "are involuntarily shut out" of the legal system.2
Thus, she advocates the decriminalization of off-exchange derivative
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. - Ed. I thank Brian
Balyeat, Stuart Banner, Chris Boehning, Atsushi Kinami, Rick Lempert, Ronald Mann,
Curtis Milhaupt, Bill Miller, Adam Pritchard, Mark Ramseyer, Brian Simpson, Lynn Stout,
Hitomi Tonomura, and Omri Yadlin. The Nippon Life Insurance Company's endowment at
the University of Michigan Law School provided generous support.
1. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, The Origin ofthe New York Stock Exchange, 1791-1860, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 113 {1998); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Con
tractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 {1992); Robert C.
Ellickson, A Hypothesis ofWealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry,
5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83 {1989); Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Efficient Scope of Private

Transactions-Cost-Reducing Institlltions: The Successes and Failures of Commodities Ex
changes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 229 {1995); Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in
Japan's Secret World ofSumo, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 {1997).

2. Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in
the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE LJ. 701, 777-83 {1999).
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trading, but rejects civil enforceability of such contracts - the exact
approach adopted in Japan three centuries ago. Similarly, in early
2000, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, the Treasury Secretary,
and the chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
called on Congress to exempt over-the-counter derivatives from the
Commodity Exchange Act.3 Dojima provides an empirical basis for
analyzing these regulatory approaches, as well as more general pro
posals for exchange self-regulation.4
Second, this Article explores claims made by others that legal in
tervention can improve the welfare of market participants only when
participants have poor judgment or face high drafting costs.5 Absent
these circumstances, legal intervention hurts participants.
After
nearly half a century of forced reliance by Dojima participants on ex
tralegal arrangements, the shogunate in 1773 temporarily made fu
tures contracts enforceable in court. Comparison of pre- and post1773 Dojima market indicators thus offers a unique opportunity to
analyze the market-wide effects of legal intervention.
Third, unlike the bartered exchange transactions (among, for in
stance, ranchers, whalers, and diamond merchants) that provide the
basis of much recent scholarship, derivatives transactions can be quite
complex. Because losses from derivative trading are not limited to the
amount invested, huge losses may result - as recent billion-dollar
losses at Barings Bank, Metallgesellschaft, Orange County, and
Sumitomo Corporation demonstrate. This Article is the first to ex
amine extralegal rules arising from such complex transactions. Be
cause the Exchange data lend themselves to accepted econometric
techniques, this Article also attempts to calculate rough measures of
market efficiency.
In addition, while I do not claim that this Article supplants the ex
cellent work of Japanese economic historians on Dojima,6 it is one of

3. See Gerard Baker, Greenspan Wants Derivatives Freed Up, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000,
at 11.
4. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997)
(proposing self-regulation); A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace
Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999)
(same); see also Tokushii, Rekishi ni Manabu "Shijo" tai "Kokka" [Special Issue: Lessons
from History on the Market Versus the State], PRESIDENT 251 (Nov. 1999) (series of articles
focusing on Dojima in Japanese business magazine).
5. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989); David Chamy, Nonlegal Sanc
tions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 375, 429-44 (1990).
6. See, e.g., NORITAKA Dom, KOME TO EDO JIDAI [RICE AND THE TOKUGAWA ERA]
(1980); MATAO MIYAMOTO, KlNSEI NIHON NO SHIJO KEIZAI (EARLY MODERN JAPANESE
MARKET ECONOMICS] (1988); TOKUICID SIDMAMOTO, TOKUGAWA JIDAI NO SHOKEN
SHIJO NO KENKYO (REsEARCH ON TOKUGAWA ERA SECURITIES MARKETS] (1953);
MASAIDKO SUGIB, TOKI TO SAKIMONO TORIHIKI NO RlRON: WAGA KUNI SAKIMONO
TORIHIKI SEIDO NO SEIRITSU NI KANSURU KENKYO (THEORY OF SPECULATION AND
FORWARDS TRANSACTIONS: REsEARCH ON THE EsTABLISHMENT OF FORWARDS
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the very few works on Dojima available in English,7 and the first in
any language to place Dojima in context using a law-and-economics
methodology. Although the study of early modern Japanese institu
tions can be daunting (in this Article, for instance, I rely heavily on
eighteenth-century documents written, unfortunately, in eighteenth
century Japanese), the gap in the literature is remarkable nonetheless.
Dojima merits obligatory mention in virtually every popular work, in
troductory textbook, and law review article on derivatives and mar
kets as "the world's first organized futures market."8 Moreover,
Dojima development bears striking resemblance to that of early
Western markets, suggesting that similar private-ordering systems
tend to arise in similar institutional environments - independent of
social structures, cultural constraints, and (arguably) Western concep
tions of contract, norms, and reputation.
I am the first to acknowledge the sketchiness of some of the 300year-old evidence from early modern Japan. But the best evidence
available, which I have attempted to assemble here, leads to two cen
tral claims. First, Exchange participants appear to have developed ef
fective means of discipline, governance, and dispute settlement, with
only minimal "shadow-of-regulation" input from the state. Second,
the Dojima Rice Exchange appears to have performed well when fu
tures trading was illegal, when it was made legal but contracts were le
gally unenforceable, and when contracts were legally enforceable.
The government's decision to make futures contracts legally enforce
able appears not to have dramatically increased - or for that matter
decreased - several market performance measures.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets forth the history of the
Exchange, describes trading mechanics and regulation, and discusses

TRANSACTIONS IN JAPAN] (1984); Takatoshi Ito, 18 Seiki, Dojima no Kame Sakimono Shijii
no Kiiritsusei ni Tsuite [Regarding the Efficiency ofthe 18th Century Dojima Futures Market],
KEIZAI KENKYO 339 (1993); Shigeru Wakita, Kinsei Osaka Dojima Kame Sakimono
Shijii ni Okeru Giiriteki Kitai no Seiritsu [The Establishment of Rational Expectations in the
Early Modern Dojima Rice Futures Market in Osaka], 47 KEIZAI KENKYD 238 (1996).
44

7. A search of U.S. scholarship reveals only one article: Ulrike Schaede, Fonvards and
Futures in Tokugawa-Period Japan: A New Perspective on the Diijima Rice Market, 13 J.
BANK. & FIN. 487 (1989) [hereinafter Schaede, Forwards and Futures]. A slightly different
version appears as Ulrike Schaede, The Development of Organized Futures Trading: The
Osaka Rice Bill Market of 1730, in JAPANESE FINANCIAL MARKET REsEARCH 339 f.>V.T.
Ziemba et al. eds., 1991). Each is largely a finance-centered description of trading mechan
ics. In this Article, in addition to adopting a different methodology, I rely on data and
sources not examined by Schaede and sources not available at the time of that article's pub
lication.
8. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 306
(1996); BARBARA B. DIAMOND & MARK P. KOLLAR, 24-HOUR TRADING: THE GLOBAL
NETWORK OF FlmJREs AND OPTIONS MARKETS 6-9 (1989); JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE
HISTORY OF COMMODITY FlmJREs TRADING AND ITS REGULATION 3 (1987); RICHARD J.
TEWELES & F'RANKJ. JONES, THE FlmJREs GAME: WHO WINS? WHO LOSES? WHY? 8-9
(2d ed. 1987); Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their
Regulation, 55 Mn. L. REV. 1, 10 (1996).
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reasons why the world's first organized futures exchange began at
Dojima and not elsewhere. Part II discusses the governance and anti
manipulation institutions of the Exchange and analyzes Dojima's rela
tive reliance on formal internal rules rather than informal constraints.
Part III attempts to measure the efficiency of the institutions discussed
in Parts I and II by using price data gathered from eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century Japanese documents. Part IV examines the effect
of state-provided dispute resolution at Dojima by comparing dispute
resolution and performance measures at Dojima before, during, and
after the period in which shogunate courts were open to Dojima suits
(1773-1784).
I.

THE MARKET

A. Economic, Social, and Legal Setting
Around 1600, Ieyasu Tokugawa led a coalition of local lords to vic
tory in battle and established a Japanese national dynasty that would
last until the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Though Tokugawa Japan is
generally characterized as isolationist and peaceful,9 recent scholarship
casts doubt on strong isolationist claims, noting that most Europeans
left on their own after losing a trade war to the D11tch, and that Japan
was always open to trade with other Asian countries.10 But peaceful it
certainly appears to have been, as the Tokugawa unification marked
the end of 100 years of civil war and a prelude to the dramatic changes
that would occur in the Western-influenced late-nineteenth century.
With peace came growth in population, cities, and commerce. Edo
(modem-day Tokyo) became the country's political center, while
Osaka - the "country's kitchen" - became the commercial center.
Unlike many other feudal societies, Japan enjoyed a flourishing mar
ket economy, a development attributable to a combination of restric
tions on foreign trade, a fragmented political system of 250 economi
cally interdependent feudal domains, and the need of feudal leaders to
fund expensive, centrally mandated trips to Edo every two years under
a system of alternate residence.11 Economic specialization increased,
9. See, e.g., WALTER LEFEBER, THE CLASH: A HISTORY OF U.S.-JAPANESE
RELATIONS 8 (1997); PATRICK SMITH, JAPAN: A REINTERPRETATION 53 (1997); TETSURO
WATSUJI, SAKOKU: NIHON NO HIGEKI [NATIONAL ISOLATION: THE TRAGEDY OF JAPAN]
(1953).

10. See, e.g., RONALD P. TOBY, STATE AND DIPLOMACY IN EARLY MODERN JAPAN:
ASIA IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOKUGAWA BAKUFU (1984); Kazui Tashiro, Foreign
Relations During the Edo Period: Sakoku Reexamined, 8 J. JAPANESE STUD. 283 (Susan
Downing Videen trans., 1982); Robert LeRoy Innes, The Door Ajar: Japan's Foreign Trade
in the Seventeenth Century (1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan)
(on file with author).
11. See, e.g., YASUNARI MARUYAMA, NIHON KINSEI KOTSOSHI NO KENKYO [STUDY
OF TRANSPORTATION HISTORY IN EARLY MODERN JAPAN] 585-600 (1989); Kenji Date,
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and the port city of Osaka, located near many large rice fields, became
a center of agricultural commerce and industry.
The Tokugawa government did not rely on a single currency, but
three - gold coin (mostly used in Eastern Japan), silver currency (by
weight, mostly used in Western Japan, including Osaka), and copper
coin (used nationwide). But currency demand outpaced production,
due at least in part to the Tokugawa government's monopoly over
gold and silver mines. Local domains turned to substitutes, often
minting their own currency.12 Sometimes financial instruments such as
promissory notes, bills of exchange, and letters of credit also filled the
gap.13
In part because of its availability and ease of measurement, rice
became a substitute currency.14 Rice, "the most important commodity
in Tokugawa society,''15 was the measure by which the shogunate fig
ured its annual budget.16 Many feudal lords collected taxes from peas
ant subjects in rice and financed their governments by converting rice
into currency at markets. Domain lords stored their rice in ware
houses in Osaka, and, in a preliminary step toward the creation of an
organized marketplace, paid Osaka merchants to manage it as their
agents.17
The relative social status of the feudal lords and warehouse mer
chants was quite clear. Tokugawa society was divided into four he
reditary vocational status groups, in descending order: samurai, farmEdo ni Okeru Shoko no Keihi Seikatsu ni Tsuite [The Consumptive Life of Edo Period Feu
dal Lords], 4 REKISHIGAKU KENKYO 75 {1935).
12 See YOTARO SAKUDO, NIHON KAREi KIN'YOSHI NO KENKYO: HOKEN SHAKAI NO
SHIN'YO TSUKA NI KANSURU KISOTEKI KENKYO [A STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF JAPANESE
CURRENCY IN FEUDAL SOCIETY] 33-58 {1961); Sydney Crawcour, The Development of a
Credit System in Seventeenth-Century Japan, 21 J. ECON. HIST. 342 {1961).
13. Bills of credit first appeared in Osaka in 1628. See MATAJI MIYAMOTO, OSAKA
CHONIN [OSAKA MERCHANTS] 41-44 {1957); see also SUSUMU KITAHARA, EDO NO
FUDASASlil [TOKYO MONEYLENDERS] 7-8 {1985); Masaru Iwahashi, Tokugawa Jidai no
Kahei Surya [Currency Distribution in the Tokugawa Era] in NIHON KEIZAI NO HATTEN
[nm DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE ECONOMICS] {Mataji Umemura et al. eds., 1976). Bills
of exchange are said to have begun in Europe in the late twelfth century. See Meir Kohn,
Bills ofExchange and the Money Market to 1600, in MEIR KOHN, FINANCE, BUSINESS, AND
GOVERNMENT BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION {forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at
1, on file with author and available at http://www.sm.com).
14. For an eloquent description of rice as pure commodity, see BERTOLT BRECHT, The
Measures Taken, in THE MEASURES TAKEN, AND OTHER LEHRSTOCKE 23-24 (Carl R.

Mueller et al. trans., 1997) {"What is rice anyway?/Do I know what rice is?/How should I
know who should know?/I don't know what rice is./All I know is its price.").

15. Tsuneo Sato, Tokugawa Villages and Agriculture, in TOKUGAWA JAPAN: THE
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ANTECEDENTS OF MODERN JAPAN 37, 73 (Chie Nakane &
Shinzaburo Oishi eds., 1990).
16. See FuYUn DOMON, Eno SHONIN NO KEIZAIGAKU
TOKUGAWA MERCHANTS] 9 {1996).

[THE ECONOMICS OF

17. See OSAMU WAKITA, KINSEi HOKEN SHAKAI NO KEIZAI KOZO
STRUCTURE OF EARLY MODERN FEUDAL SOCIETY] 23-36 {1963).

[THE ECONOMIC
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ers, artisans, and merchants. The merchant status group was not
monolithic, including both merchant property owners and day labor
ers. But merchants were clearly at the bottom of the social hierarchy,
above only the extremely underprivileged, and were often subject to
persecution from above by feudal lords in the form of asset confisca
tion and from below by peasants in the form of arson and theft.18
The Tokugawa legal system was one of fragmented federalism.19
Tokugawa law applied in principle only in territory controlled directly
by the central government, or perhaps more precisely, the Tokugawa
feudal lord - about one-third of Japan, which included Osaka. The
remainder of Japan was governed by a hodgepodge of feudal laws, the
only guiding principle being a supremacy clause of sorts that man
dated (in 1615) local statutes not contravene those of the govem
ment.20 While property rights were not afforded statutory protection,
local domains enforced "de facto property rights."21 Spotted use of le
gal precedents may have occurred in some regions,22 but it was not un
til 1742 that important statutes and precedents were assembled into a
code.23
By most accounts, dispute resolution was hierarchical, individualis
tic, and unpredictable. The judicial system relied on the Tokugawa
social structure to control and channel disputes. Disputants first
brought their claims to the local village leader and were referred to
the next level in the hierarchy only if they could not be resolved in the
first instance. The government explicitly discouraged suits against su
periors or against members of another social status group, perhaps to
preclude pgtential threats to its sovereignty.24 The primary goals of
those in charge of the legal system appear to have been settlement and
the maintenance of social order, goals made more attainable by the in-

18. See, e.g.,
36 (2d ed. 1988).

JOHN G. ROBERTS, MITSUI: THREE CENTURIES OF JAPANESE BUSINESS

19. See J. MARK RAMSEYER, ODD MARKETS IN JAPANESE HISTORY: LAW AND
ECONOMIC GROWlll 18 (1996).
20. See, e.g., M!NJI KANREI RUISHO [COLLECTION OF Civ1L LAWS] (Yutaka Tezuka &
Mitsuo Riko eds., 1969); HARuo OKUBO, EDO NO KErnO OSADAMEGAKI HYAKKAJO
[CRIMINAL PROVISIONS OF TOKUGAWA ERA OSADAMEGAKI] (1978); CARL STEENSTRUP,
A HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN UNTIL 1868, at 121 (1991).
21. Tetsuji Okazaki & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Evolution ofEconomic Systems: The
Case of Japan, in THE INSTITUTIONS OF EAST AsIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 482, 494
(Yujiro Hayami & Masahiko Aoki eds., 1998).

22. See Yoshiro Hiramatsu, KinseihO [Early Modem Law], in 11 IwANAMI KOZA NIBON
REKISHI [IWANAMI SERIES ON JAPANESE HISTORY] 331, 341-42 (1976).

23. This code was in the form of the Osadamegaki. See DAN FENNO HENDERSON, 1
CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW: TOKUGAWA AND MODERN 15-16 (1965).
24.
(1952).

See Dan F. Henderson, Some Aspects of Tokugawa Law, 27 WASH. L. REV. 85, 92
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termingling of civil and criminal law - civil litigants might face such
novel sanctions as beheading for refusing to settle.25
B.

Beginnings

Dojima's story begins in 1616 - four years before the Mayflower
left England, and fifteen years after the arrival in Japan of Englishman
William Adams (the character fictionalized in James Clavell's Shogun)
- when a rice merchant from Nagoya (located halfway between
Osaka and Edo) named Chozaemon takes a trip to Edo. According to
the traditional - which does not necessarily mean historically accu
rate - story, along the way to Edo, Chozaemon stops at an inn where
he meets a traveler from Sendai (north of Edo). Chozaemon strikes a
deal with the man: you tell me if there's a rice shortage up North; I'll
tell you if there's one down South. Five years later, on his pilgrimage
to the Ise Shrine, the man from the North visits Chozaemon in Nagoya
and informs him that this year's northern harvest looks bleak; next
year it looks as if the North will send to Tokyo only half of its usual
crop. Chozaemon begins hoarding rice from that year's southern
bumper crop.
A fellow Nagoyan named Ichizaemon hears of
Chozaemon's efforts, and asks him to purchase 500 ryo worth of rice
on his behalf. Chozaemon is eager to help, but because he has no
warehouse to store that much rice on top of his own, he makes a deal.
Pay me just 60 ryo now, he says, and when I sell the rice next year,
you'll pay me the remaining 440 ryo along with interest at the rate of 3
sho (about a pound) of rice, and I'll give you the profits., But if the
price of rice falls, and it's not profitable to sell, I'll keep your 60 ryo.
Fortunately for both, the price skyrockets. Chozaemon realizes that
he can do this again, and does so regularly, issuing 100 ryo of rice "re
ceipts" for a two percent down payment, taking a middleman's fee,
and setting contract maturity dates of two to three months.26
In the following years, several feudal lords begin to follow
Chozaemon's example, issuing rice receipts that entitle the bearer to
rice from the lords' agent-managed Osaka warehouses. By issuing re
ceipts, lords could ensure a steady income stream from their otherwise
seasonal and weather-dependent product. Like other promissory
notes or bills of exchange that would dominate the Tokugawa mer
chant economy,27 the receipts entitled the bearer to a certain quantity
of goods - rice in an Osaka warehouse. But unlike other goods on

25. See, e.g., HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 101, 132-62 (noting that "criminal-civil dis
tinction was not clearly observed and Tokugawa practice" and including transcript of civil
suit in which local official routinely threatens death penalty).
26. See Dom, supra note 6, at 32-33; SUGIE, supra note 6, at 8-9.
27. By the end of the Tokugawa period, 99% of payments between merchants were set
tled by bills. See SAKUDO, supra note 12, at 249.
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which promissory notes or bills of exchange were based, rice was itself
a form of currency, and accordingly, these rice receipts, or bills, soon
acquired a currency-like quality with a value independent of the un
derlying physical rice. Warehouses routinely issued "empty" bills
(kiimai kitte) that were traded as credit instruments rather than actual
entitlements to physical rice, which did not exist in the issuing ware
house.28 Records of the Osaka city commissioner show that by 1654
(and perhaps several years earlier), Osaka traders had formed a func
tioning market for these rice bills.29
The trading house of Saburaemon Yodoya, in the Kitahama dis
trict of Osaka, became the primary trading site for rice bills.30 As
!hara Saikaku, the son of an Osaka merchant and one of Japan's most
gifted novelists, wrote some 300 years ago:
The Kitahama Rice Market, as is fitting of Osaka's position as the largest
port in Japan, sometimes had speculative transactions of 50,000 kan [42.6
tons] in a two-hour period. The rice was crammed to the tops of the
warehouses. People bought and sold by speculating based on the condi
tion of the sky, the evening winds, and the morning rains. They argued
over a mere one or two bu of silver, the market was full of people, and
people who had never met before would trade thousands or even ten
thousands of koku of rice, and once they had clapped hands over it, nei
ther party would breach the contract.31

Saikaku's prose suggests a glorious market of which the state might
have been proud. But authorities' initial larger concern was urban
congestion, as traffic jams on Kitahama Road outside of the House of
Yodoya were a common occurrence. In 1688 the government re
quested that rice traders move their market across the river to Dojima
(today a few blocks from Osaka Station). They complied, and in 1697
Yodoya moved to Dojima as well.32
In 1705, the shogunate closed Yodoya's business and confiscated
his assets.33
The official reason for the shogunate's action was
Yodoya's criminal violation of sumptuary laws by ostentatious dis-

28. See, e.g., SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 14-15.
29. See SAKUDO, supra note 12, at 345.
30. Although many sources cite Yodoya as the birthplace of futures trading, it is possi
ble that Yodoya was one of several trading sites. See SUGIE, supra note 6, at 12.
31. IHARA SAIKAKU, NIPPON EITAIGURA [JAPAN'S ETERNAL STOREHOUSE] (1688),
quoted in YAMATANE GROUP KINEN SHUPPANKAI, NIHON SHI.JOSHI [HISTORY OF
JAPANESE MARKETS] 62 (1989).
32 See, e.g., MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 196.
33. Yodoya's wealth was astounding; if the commonly cited inventory of his wealth is
accurate, he was a thousand times richer than other merchants, was owed 100 million ryii
(several times the national income of Japan), and the amount confiscated by the government
was equal to two hundred years of shogunate income. See, e.g., E.S. Crawcour, Changes in
Japanese Commerce in the Tokugawa Period, 22 J. ASIAN STUD. 387, 392 (1962).
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plays of wealth.34 But some scholars suggest that Yodoya had been
overeager in enforcing loans made to influential lords in Kyushu and
Shikoku,35 while others claim that the shogunate actually closed Yo
doya because it wanted to halt futures transactions, which it consid
ered gambling.36 Gambling or not, the government had additional rea
sons to stop the trade - it believed that futures transactions led to
artificially inflated physical rice prices, thereby leading to general
price inflation.37 Prohibited or not, market participants continued to
trade rice bills in futures transactions on the black market in front of
Yodoya's house. Only spot trading (the trading of physical rice) con
tinued legally at Dojima.
C.

Formal Establishment

In 1716, Yoshimune became the eighth Tokugawa shogun, taking
over a government with deteriorating finances. Yoshimune soon be
gan a series of economic reforms, including a reduction of government
spending and increases in land tax collection in 1721, and restrictions
on feudal lord extravagance in 1724. One of Yoshimune's greatest
concerns was falling rice prices. As Table 1 shows, prices had fallen
considerably from the period immediately before Yoshimune took of
fice.

34. See SUGIE, supra note 6, at 177; James L. McOain, Space, Power, Wealth and Status
in Seventeenth-Century Osaka, in OSAKA: THE MERCHANT'S CAPITAL OF EARLY MODERN
JAPAN (James L. McClain & Osamu Wakita eds., 1999) at 44, 58.
35. See Dmn, supra note 6, at 176-79; SUGIE, supra note 6, at 17.
36. See DOHI, supra note 6, at 176-79; SUGIE, supra note 6, at 17.
37. See MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 196-97; SUGIE, supra note 6, at 17.
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TABLE 1: OSAKA RICE PRICES,
Year

Price (Silver

1713
1714
1715
1716
1717
1718
1719
1720
1721
1722
1723
1724
1725
1726
1727
1728
1729
1730
Source:

2583
1713-1730

monme per koku)
155.0
155.2
115.5
98.8
110.9
33.0
42.2
68.2
75.0
44.5
41.5
47.4
55.5
56.9
40.6
40.6
30.4
32.9

RYOzWO YAMAZAKI, KINSEi BUKKASHI KENKYO [A

STUDYOFEARLYMODERNPRICEHISTORY]

92-93 (1983).

Low rice prices were a concern because members of the military
received their salaries in rice, which they subsequently sold for cash to
brokers,38 and because feudal lords repaid loans from local temples
and shrines in rice.39 The government could easily inflate rice prices
by controlling supply; the trick was to do so without causing wide
spread inflation. Just as the previous government had outlawed fu
tures transactions because of their perceived tendency to raise rice
prices (and rice prices alone), Yoshimune - later dubbed the "rice
shogun" - decided to employ them precisely for that reason in order
to appease demands from the military and lords. In 1730, after re
ceiving a petition from Tokyo merchants in Osaka (whom the gov
ernment apparently felt it could trust more than the locals ,40 Yoshi
mune officially authorized futures trading at the Dojima market.
Yoshimune's 1730 edict stated in pertinent part:

)

38. See, e.g., GEORGE SANSOM, A HISTORY OF JAPAN 1615-1867, at 164 (1963).
39. See ROBERTS, supra note 18, at 16.
40. See Dom, supra note 6, at 89; MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 196.
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The rice trade of Osaka shall be conducted strictly in keeping with the
customs observed until now, and such dealing in futures shall be permit
ted for the merchants of the provinces, as well as Osaka middlemen. The
fifty clearinghouses historically in existence shall conduct their business
only under their private regulations and following their old customs in
margin accounts, closing accounts, and so on; they shall extend their
business as widely as possible, so that they may not cause inconvenience
to the rice trade. The purpose of this authorization is to raise rice prices,
and they should accordingly engage freely in their trade. The [old rice
exchange] is abolished, but all the old customs are hereby valid. If any
one attempts to deceive the public by calling a rule an old custom when
in fact it is not, he shall be tried and severely punished. Except in ex

treme circumstances, no suit relating to rice trade shall be heard. 41
Yoshimune sent a second edict specifically to Edo, to which he at
tached the first, and ordered simply that "no petition by a person of
this town as to the rice market in Osaka shall be heard."42
D. Trading Practices
Despite the legal unenforceability of futures contracts after Yo
shim.une's edict, futures trading flourished at the formally established
Dojima Exchange. In this Section, in order to describe the functional
aspects of the Exchange, I analyze the Dojima Rice Exchange using
the eight factors Roberta Romano has identified as features of futures
exchanges.43 Although forward transactions appeared in Europe be
fore Dojima's formal establishment,44 the following characteristics
make Dojima the world's first organized futures exchange.

41. BEISHO KYDKI (1616-1870) (emphasis added) reprinted as MATAJI MIYAMOTO, 3
OSAKA KEIZAI SHIRYO SHOSEI (COMPILATION OF OSAKA ECONOMY DOCUMENTS] 76-77
(1973); see also SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 9-10; SUGIE, supra note 6, at 31. The decree
applied specifically to futures contracts. Spot transactions at Dojima apparently had sepa·
rate legal treatment. At some point in the An'ei era (1772-1780), the shogunate systemati
cally gave spot transaction suits precedence over other suits, rendering quick judgments and
accepting filings on days 'other than the two-a-month "suing days" specified for such matters.
See SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 20.
42. BEISHO KYDKI, supra note 41, at 77.
43. See Romano, supra note 8, at 10-20. Romano's list is similar to others, see, for ex
ample, A.W.B. Simpson, The Origins ofFutures Trading in the Liverpool Cotton Market, in
EsSAYS FOR PATRICK ATIYAH 179, 180-81 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1991). Un
less otherwise indicated, I draw here principally from BEISHO KYDKI, supra note 41, and
more modem accounts reported in MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 195-232; SHIMAMOTO, s11pra note 6, at 11-78; and SUGIE, supra note 6, at 31-83.

44. See Meir Kohn, Risk Instruments in the Medieval and Early Modern Economy, in
KOHN, supra note 13, at 10-12. The mid-sixteenth-century wagers on exchange rates at
Antwerp that Kohn says "seem like modem futures contracts,'' id. at 12 & n.37, appear
merely to be forwards, with no evidence of standardized contracts, clearinghouses, and the
like. See RICHARD EHRENBERG, CAPITAL & FINANCE IN THE AGE OF THE RENAISSANCE:
A STUDY OFTIIB FuGGERS AND THEIR CONNECTIONS 243-44 (H.M. Lucas trans., 1928).

August 2000]

First Futures Exchange
1.

2585

Standardized Terms

A forward contract is an agreement for the future delivery of an
asset at a specified price at the end of a designated period of time. A
futures exchange is a market in which participants trade standardized
forward contracts. Futures contracts thus normally have standardized
terms: a typical modem London Metal Exchange futures contract, for
instance, specifies quotation unit, grade of material, quantity, price,
delivery terms and procedures, and contract duration.45 At Dojima,
the standard trading unit was 100 koku, each contract was equal to 100
koku, and minimum price movements were measured at one koku.
Delivery terms and procedures depended on the type of rice (rice was
chosen by the market from the area that had the best harvest, for in
stance, Kaga in the summer) and the warehouse in question. Because
rice could be "branded" by harvest location, geography provided a
convenient grading mechanism.46
Contract duration was fixed by a trimester trading calendar, con
sisting of a spring term (January 8-April 28), a summer term (May 7
- October 9), and a winter term (October 17 -December 24).47 Con
tracts had to be settled by the closing date of each term, and the end of
each term included a three-day liquidation period. The market closed
at the end of each term, and no trades for the following period could
be made between terms. Although the system restricted the ability of
traders to contract freely, it also provided an institutional constraint to
prevent transactions with infinite time horizons that no market - in
cluding most modem markets - could handle.
Dojima's major innovation was the "book" transaction system
(choaimai) for recording such trades. In the book transaction system,
when traders reached an agreement, the names of the parties and the
amount of rice traded were recorded in the market "book." The par
ties were then required to complete the transaction through cash set
tlement by the close of the trading term. Under this system, neither
party required rice or cash when they made the bargain, making the
practice well-suited for hedging. The book transaction system enabled
organized futures trading at Dojima.

45. The Exchange also has special contract rules pertaining to such matters as quality
and quotation unit for each commodity. See ROBERT GIBSON-JARVIE, THE LONDON
METAL EXCHANGE: A COMMODITY MARKET 29-33 (1976); RUDOLF WOLFF & Co LTD.,
WOLFF'S GUIDE TO THE LONDON METALS EXCHANGE 199-221 (5th ed. 1995).
46. On the importance of grading, see Pirrong, supra note 1, at 234-35; Simpson, supra
note 43, at 182.
47. Dates may vary based on days of the week, and the winter and spring terms may
technically have been one term split by the year-end holidays. See SHIMAMOTO, supra note
6, at 38. Technically the months are lunar months and do not correspond exactly to the solar
Gregorian calendar. The particular dates referred to herein are not important enough to
merit revision of dates to the Gregorian system.
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Transferability

Futures contracts are readily transferable, which allows for closing
out a position by taking the opposite side of the transaction. At
Dojima, futures contracts were easily and commonly transferred, and
parties could effectively close out positions by entering the opposite
transaction (a buy versus a sell for the same amount of rice) on the
book. Thus, as in modem futures markets, Dojima traders routinely
closed out positions without purchasing the underlying physical quan
tity of rice, thereby reducing transaction costs.

3.

Auction Trading

Futures are usually traded in a pure auction model, unlike stock
exchanges, which often use a specialist system. Dojima, like the fa
mous hand signals and shouts of the Chicago market pits, also relied
on an auction system. No specialist was necessary to make a trade.

4.

Price Limits

Price limits are maximum daily price changes that a contract speci
fies can occur. When a futures contract moves outside the price limit,
no transactions can take place on that day. Such limits are used to
prevent large fluctuations. Although Dojima futures contracts appear
to have had no formal price limits, as Part II discusses, another institu
tion - the firebox system - performed a similar function.

5.

Price Discovery

According to theory, futures market prices communicate price in
formation to underlying spot markets, and that information moves
spot prices in the right direction.48 The Dojima market performed a
similar price discovery function for physical rice transactions. The
data presented in Part III provide empirical support, which is at least
tentatively buttressed by two bits of anecdotal evidence. First, as a
rule, trading in the Dojima futures market began two hours before
trading in the Dojima spot market, suggesting that traders used futures
information in their spot trading.49 Second, Dojima price information
was so significant that it was transmitted immediately to Edo (Tokyo),

48. See, e.g., FRANK J. FABOZZI ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS AND
INSTITUTIONS 507-08 (2d ed. 1998).
49. See SAKUDO, supra note 12, at 369.
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350 miles away and normally a six-day journey, by flag signals, smoke
signals, and carrier pigeons.50

6.

Settlement

Futures contracts are settled in cash, and sometimes by physical
delivery. At Dojima, very few contracts were actually settled by
physical delivery; like Chicago grain markets, Dojima was largely a
place where "men who don't own something are selling that some
thing to men who don't really want it."51 In most cases, traders settled
all open positions through cash payment, a method made simple and
convenient by the book transaction system.
7.

Clearinghouses

In futures markets, a clearinghouse (normally an independent cor
poration) guarantees a transaction by entering into both sides of a fu
tures contract. When parties in futures markets reach an agreement,
they actually contract with the clearinghouse as a third party. The
clearinghouse becomes the seller to the buyer of the contract, and the
buyer to the seller. In so doing, it guarantees performance and re
duces risk from market transactions. It also reduces transaction costs
by simplifying the process of unwinding positions by the settlement
(delivery) date by allowing a party to contract with the clearinghouse
and avoid searching for the original counterparty to the transaction.
Remarkably, the seventeenth-century Dojima Exchange had such
a clearinghouse institution. Initially, moneychangers, which numbered
more than one thousand in 1700,52 changed rice into cash - a function
made necessary largely because of the lack of a single unified cur
rency. As transactions became more numerous and complex, mer
chants relied more on these moneychangers - now functioning as
brokers - to hold their deposits, and eventually to manage their af
fairs. These brokers soon developed into full-fledged clearinghouses,
serving as transaction intermediaries between contracting parties.
While forward contract trading apparently occurred in Europe at
about the same time as Dojima, the clearinghouse system sets Dojima
apart as the first formalized futures exchange.53

50. See MATAJI MIYAMOTO, NIBON SHOGYOSHI [JAPANESE COMMERCIAL HISTORY]
120-21 (1949). But see MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 386-402 (noting the lack of united mar
ket until the mid-eighteenth century and finding less correlation among isolated markets).
51. Morton Rothstein, Frank Norris and Popular Perceptions of the Market, 56 AGRIC.
HIST. 58 (1982), cited in WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE'S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE
GREAT WEST 125 (1992).
•

52 See McClain, supra note 34, at 64-65.
53. Most modem exchanges rely on one central clearinghouse institution, while Dojima
had multiple clearinghouses. Although competition among multiple clearinghouses operat-
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Clearinghouse Requirements

Clearinghouses must be compensated for their undertaking of risk,
and compensation normally comes in the form of margin and daily set
tlement requirements. Clearinghouses set margin requirements for
members, who must maintain specified amounts in their margin ac
counts to continue trading with the clearinghouse. Daily settlement
requirements mitigate against the possibility of cumulative losses.
Dojima clearinghouses had similar requirements, requiring margin
payments to incur trading risk and requiring traders to enter their
transactions into the house's trading book at the end of the trading
day. The clearinghouses employed a ten-day mark-to-market mecha
nism, adjusting margin accounts every ten days to reflect changes in
the value of traders' positions. As in modem futures markets, cus
tomers who experienced gains over the ten-day period could withdraw
funds from margin accounts, while those who experienced losses had
their margin account balance reduced. And as in modem futures
markets, lending institutions arose to help traders finance margin re
quirements.54
The historical record suggests at least four reasons why Dojima
participants were able to construct these formal market institutions at
least 100 years before similar institutions developed in Europe. First,
the shogunate's policy, intentional or otherwise, of allowing competi
tion among three forms of currency fostered the development of
money exchange brokers.ss These brokers formed the basis of the
clearinghouse institutions and designed alternative payment systems
(such as bills of credit) that led to the development of standardized fu
tures contracts. Second, the feudal political system made financial
demands on lords but did not limit their ability to exert power in the
marketplace. Third, because rice was both an alternative currency and
a seasonal, weather-sensitive commodity, it encouraged formal hedg
ing by these lords. Finally, socioeconomic and even religious struc
tures may have played a role. Merchants, divorced from the land, had
both the ability and incentives to create a central marketplace in
Osaka, and unlike some of their European counterparts, were unfet
tered by a Christian or Muslim moral code that discouraged or pro
hibited debt and usury.s6
ing as brokers might seem efficient, the duplication of basic clearinghouse services by multi
ple parties may have reduced potential gains.
54. See MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 205.
55. On the merits of currency competition, see F.A. HAYEK, DENATIONALISATION OF
MONEY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONCURRENT CURRENCIES

(1976).
56. See OSAMU wAKITA, KINSEi OSAKA NO KEIZAI TO BUNKA (ECONOMICS AND
CULTURE OF EARLY MODERN OSAKA] 44 (1994); JACK WEATHERFORD, THE HISTORY OF
MONEY: FROM SANDSTONE TO CYBERSPACE

73-74 (1997) (noting that "if Christians lent
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Regulation

The Japanese government was largely uninvolved in the develop
ment of these futures exchange institutions. Four brief exceptions
tend to prove the rule. First, Yoshimune's 1730 edict established a li
censing requirement, discussed further in Section II.B. Second, until a
1765 edict provided a special exemption,57 the shogunate could (but
seldom actually did) confiscate rice bills as a criminal penalty just as it
had confiscated Yodoya's assets.58 That the assets of a merchant as
large as Yodoya could be confiscated so easily is said to have caused
other merchants to take great care in subsequent dealings.59 Third, the
shogunate occasionally regulated the national rice market, mandating
limits on the volume of rice that feudal lords could send to Osaka to
prevent dumping, and setting city- and nation-wide price floors and
ceilings on physical rice in times of crisis.60 Finally, as discussed fur
ther in Part IV, in 1773, after nearly fifty years of denying civil en
forceability, the government agreed to hear disputes and required rice
sold at Dojima to bear the official seal of its newly appointed rice in
spector.61 As two economic historians put it, "[t]he Osaka rice market

money for interest, the Catholic church excommunicated them" and that "[t]he Koran spe
cifically prohibited bills of exchange"). While usury prohibitions may have hampered the
development of debt and financial intermediaries in Europe, they did encourage the early
development of bills of exchange. See Kohn, supra note 13, at 9-10.
57.

See Dom, supra note 6, at 206.

58.

See supra text accompanying note 33. Confiscation of assets (kessho) was connected

with punishments for all types of crimes. The severity of the confiscation depended on the
severity of the crime. See RYOSUKE !SIDI, NIHON HOSEISlil GAISETSU [OUTLINE OF
JAPANESE LEGAL HISTORY] 495, 498 n.13 (1948) [hereinafter RYOSUI<E ISmI, NIHON
HOSEISlil GAJSETSU]; see also RYOSUKE ISmI, KEIBATSU NO REKISlil [THE HISTORY OF
PUNISHMENT] 132 (1992) (explaining how Yoshimune established graduated fine system to
complement asset confiscation in 1718). Confiscation normally applied only to the offender
and not to an offender's group. See SlilNZO TAKAYANAGI, Eno JJDAJ NO TSUMI TO
KEIBATSU SH0SETSU[CRIME ANDPuNISHMENT INTHETOKUGAWA PERIOD] 414(1988).
59.

See Yosmo SAKATA,

CRONIN [MERCHANTS] 38(1949).

60.

See Shinzaburo Oishi, Horeki, Tenmeiki no Bakusei [Shogunate Government in the
Horeki-Tenmei Era (1751-1789)], in 11 lWANAMI KOZA NIHON REKISlil [IWANAMI SERIES
ON JAPANESE HISTORY] 139 (1976); E.S. Crawcour & Kozo Yamamura, The Tokugawa
Monetary System: 1787-1868, 18 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 489, 500 (1970);
Shigeaki Yasuoka, Edo Chiiki no Osaka Torhiki Soshiki [The Trade Structure of Osaka in
the Middle Tokugawa Era], 16 DOSIDSHA SHOGAKU 290(1964). After 1830 and toward the

end of the Tokugawa government, price control measures occurred with some regularity.

See MASANORI HONJO, BAKUHANSEI SHAKAJ NO TENKAI BEIKOKU SHIJO [DEVELOPMENT
OF FEUDAL GOVERNMENT AND RICE MARKETS] 361(1994).
61. See SmMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 19; Nobuhiko Nakai & James L. McClain, Com
mercial Change and Urban Growth in Early Modem Japan, in 4 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
JAPAN 519, 587

(John Whitney Hall ed., 1991). After 1773, the shogunate still occasionally
issued decrees regarding money claims, twice announcing that money clainls must be settled
out of court, and granting amnesty to old futures-related claims. See Heiichiro Kaneda,

Tokugawa Jidai no Tokubetsu Minji Soshiihii: Kanekuji no Kenkyii [Special Procedural Law
ofthe Tokugawa Era: Research on Money Suits], 43 KOKKA GAKKAJ ZASSlil 362(1928).
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seems to have been largely beyond the control of the [govern
ment] . . . . It seems strange . . . that the [government] did not attempt
to influence the market more directly."62
Despite the shogunate's relative laxity, Dojima participants never
theless acted in the long shadow of latent governmental regulation.
Licensing requirements determined the players of the game. The mo
nopoly on futures contracts granted to Dojima likely increased the
force of internal sanctions. The threat of license confiscation may
have created additional incentives for proper behavior. The Dojima
experience thus leaves open the possibility that the development of ef
ficient rules in self-organized markets may require something less than
complete governmental withdrawal.
Regulatory developments at Dojima, especially before 1730, bear
striking resemblance to those in early European and American mar
kets. In the famous seventeenth-century Dutch tulip forwards market,
trading persisted despite six government attempts to ban such trad
ing.63 In England, the passage in 1734 of Sir John Barnard's Act, "[a]n
act to prevent the infamous practice of stock-jobbing," effectively
banned the trading of options.64 Yet despite fines for selling stock that
one does not own, option transactions apparently continued.65 In New
York, a 1792 law, the "watered-down equivalent of Barnard's Act,"
did not explicitly prohibit options transactions, but made options con
tracts void and thus unenforceable in court. In New York as in Eng
land, "time bargains went on as before, but were enforced privately,
without the assistance of the legal system."66
Still, developments at Dojima differ from the English and
American cases both in the degree of and the motives underlying gov
ernmental restrictions. English legislation expressly prohibited futures
trading, while the Japanese edict expressly legalized it, if only for one
exchange. Part of the reason for the difference may lie in motive.
Eighteenth-century English and American (and even in more recent
times)67 authorities largely feared the harmful effects of "gambling"
speculators on market prices. But, as I discuss in Part IV, the
Japanese government, which had once itself viewed futures trading

62. Crawcour & Yamamura, supra note 60, at 500.
63. See MIKE DASH, TULIPOMANIA: THE STORY OF THE WORLD'S MOST COVETED
FLOWER AND THE EXTRAORDINARY PASSIONS IT AROUSED 187-95 (2000); see also sources
cited supra note 44.
64.

STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION 104-05 (1998).

65. See id. at 106.
66. Id. at 173-74. A similar phenomenon occurred in Chicago futures markets. See
THE ECONOMIC FuNCTION OF FUTUREs MARKETS § 5.2, at 154-56
(1986).

JEFFREY WILLIAMS,

67. See Stout, supra note 2, at 717.
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with suspicion, apparently sought to promote, not to prohibit, private
ordering.

II.

RULES OF ORDER

As a full-fledged futures exchange in a relatively primitive legal
and economic system, Dojima traders needed to devise governance
mechanisms to ensure market order. This Part argues that while rela
tional contracting played a role, the Exchange chose to rely more
heavily on formal internal rules and institutions than on relational
constraints.
A.

Governance

Exchanges have historically been commercial mutual nonprofit in
stitutions managed by boards of directors and standing committees
pursuant to by-laws - possibly a consequence of member heteroge
neity.68 Dojima employed a similar structure. Until the Meiji Restora
tion of 1868, the Exchange remained a nonprofit association of trad
ers. Although Exchange expenses were originally apportioned among
members, the warehouses eventually took over payment.69 But while
warehouses paid the fees, Exchange members elected Exchange offi
cials.
Formal governance of the Exchange was preceded by monopolis
tic, geographically-based rice trader coalitions formed shortly after the
passage of the 1730 law legalizing futures trading. From these coali
tions came Exchange directors. Exchange members elected five "an
nual directors" in a general election. They also elected five "monthly
directors," but the coalition system ensured that the heads of the five
largest groups of coalitions became monthly directors by default. An
nual directors conducted the activities of the Exchange with some
measure of independence, while monthly directors more directly rep
resented member and coalition interests, thereby likely reducing
agency costs.
The system had at least one drawback. In order to maintain inde
pendence, annual directors were required to cease trading upon taking
office. But because annual director salaries could not compete with
profits that a director might otherwise earn from trading, few potential
directors wanted the job. Compensation aside, the job was not an easy
one, as directors were required to attend the Exchange daily. Those

68. See Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE LJ. 835, 841
(1980); Craig Pirrong, A Positive Theory ofFinancial Exchange Organization with Normative
Implications for Financial Market Regulation, at 37 (Working Paper, Oct. 16, 1997), at
http://www.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/pirrong.
69. See TASlilCHIRO TANAKA, NIHON TORIHIKUO RON (THEORY OF JAPANESE
MARKETs] 29 (1910); see also Schaede, Forwards and Futures, supra note 7, at 496.
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who did take the job often took sick days or purposely engaged in
trading mid-term in order to disqualify themselves from further serv
ice. In 1774, the system was modified to allow sitting annual directors
to pick their successors and serve consecutive terms, thus enabling
those who actually wanted the job and could develop professional
managerial expertise over a period of time to take the position.70
B.

Market Order

At least four ex ante institutional features of the Dojima market
may have helped to prevent market abuses: licensing, cash settlement,
the firebox pricing system, and coalitions.
1.

Licensing

The government required a license of all Exchange players.71 The
1730 shogunate edict limited the number of clearinghouses to the fifty
then in existence, and the Exchange also required each trader to pur
chase a trading license and affiliate with a clearinghouse. The shogu
nate kept strict controls on the number of authorized traders. Little
information remains regarding the criteria for allotment, and even
contemporaneous sources differ on the details: one source finds 1,351
licenses issued;72 another finds exactly 1,300.73 Traders purchased li
censes for a fee from the government, and in most circumstances could
only transfer them to their children or a worker who had been em
ployed by the trader for more than ten years.74 While some of the
traders worked as agents on behalf of feudal lord "clients," most func
tioned independently.75
The licensing system was the first regular mechanism for taxing the
commercial sector in Japan and provided a significant source of sho-

70. See MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 203; SHOHEI SUZUKI, DOJIMA KOME SHUOSHI
[HISTORY OFTHE DOJIMA RICE MARKET) 56-57 {1940).
71. The Kyoho reforms of the 1710s and 1720s stressed the formation of protective asso
ciations and licensing requirements across a wide variety of industries. See SHINZABURO
OISHI, KYOHO KAIKAKU NO SHOGYO SEISAKU [COMMERCIAL POLICY OF THE KYOHO
REFORMS] 201-03 {1998); Nakai & McClain, supra note 61, at 570-73.
72 See BEISHO KYOKI, supra note 41, at 61 (stating that the shogunate issued 451 li
censes in 1730, 538 in 1731, and 362 in 1734, for a total of 1,351, of which 451 were for spot
transactions and 900 for futures).
73. See HAMAKATA KIROKU [HAMAKATA RECORDS] {begun 1716), reprinted as
EIJIRO HONJO Er AL., 2 KINSEi SHAKAI KEIZAI SOSHO [EARLY MODERN SOCIETY
ECONOMICS SERIES! 24 {1926) (stating that the shogunate issued a total of only 1,300, in
cluding 500 in 1731, 500 in 1732, and 300 in 1736).
74. See Dom, supra note 6, at 94-95; SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 58.
75. In the Shotoku Period {1711-1715), Osaka is said to have been home to 17,727 mer
chants, of which 483 were formal agents of feudal lords. See SANSOM, supra note 38, at 128.
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gunate income.76 But from the traders' perspective, licensing not only
protected monopoly rights, it also limited the total number of dispu
tants and eliminated or at least checked the number of novice traders.
More importantly, the licensing system established a closed system in
which forced bond-posting reduced the cost of scrutinizing trading
partners and enabled punishment of participants even in the absence
of strong inter-trader reputational bonds.77 To be sure, reputation
played a role, as no repeat player would desire a reputation for un
trustworthiness.78 But the licensing requirement, which relied not di
rectly on reputation but on the ability to pay the fee (which itself may
engender reputation), also helped ensure that internally mandated
punishments could be instituted effectively by limiting participation by
outsiders.

2.

Cash Settlement

Dojima's general policy of cash settlement may have reduced op
portunities for abuse. According to Craig Pirrong, most modem
commodity futures contracts - over ninety-eight percent of physical
commodity futures contracts by volume - are settled by delivery of
the underlying asset.79 But Dojima's book transaction system lent it
self to a cash settlement system.80 Many financial economists argue
that cash-settled futures contracts are less susceptible to manipulation
through market "cornering" or "squeezing." In contrast to a physical
settlement system, potential abusers in a cash-settlement system can
not as easily use their market share to control the actual physical
commodity underlying the future.81 The cash settlement thus might
have reduced the possibility of abuse.

76. See 2 TOKUGAWA JIDAI SHOGYO SOSHO [TOKUGAWA ERA COMMERCIAL SERIES]
9 (Matajiro Akabori ed. 1965) (1913).
77. Compare to the diamond trading industry, which allows participation by nonmem
bers. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 152.
78. See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation
Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 774-75 (1999) (noting that member
ship requirements can also aid in reputational constraints).
79. See Stephen Craig Pirrong, Manipulation of Cash-Settled Futures Contracts, 74 J.
Bus. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript at 1 n.2, on file with author and available at http://
www.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/pirrong).
80. See supra text accompanying note 47.
81. Among other things, cash settlement does not allow the buyer to demand an exces
sive number of deliveries. See, e.g., Frank J. Jones, The Economics ofFutures and Options
Contracts Based on Cash Settlement, 2 J. FuTuRES MARKETS 63 (1982); Steven Manaster,
Economic Consequences ofDelivery Options for Financial Futures Contracts: Analysis and
Review, 11 REV. FuTuRES MARKETS 142 (1992); cf. Praveen Kumar & Duane J. Seppi, Fu
tures Manipulation with "Cash Settlement," 47 J. FIN. 1485 (1992) (noting that traders can

manipulate cash-settled contracts through asymmetric information exploitation by "punch
ing the settlement price"); Pirrong, supra note 79 (noting that traders can manipulate cash-
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The Firebox System

The Exchange created an institution - the firebox system - that
drastically limited a trader's ability to manipulate the market through
comering.82 In their study of modem grain futures contracts, Craig
Pirrong, David Haddock, and Roger Kormendi note four distinct
methods of deterring manipulation: formal rules of an exchange or
regulatory authority, ex post enforcement through punishment, con
tract design, and informal enforcement through reputational loss.83
The most straightforward ex ante method, they note, is the use of for
mal rules regarding position limits.84
Dojima participants utilized a modified position-limit mechanism.85
The trading day for futures started precisely at 8 a.m., but a unique
mechanism determined each day's closing time and closing price. In
the Exchange hung a wooden box containing a wick. At the beginning
of each day, Exchange officials set the wick on fire; when the fire went
out, trading for that day ended. Much like modem exchanges fix set
tlement prices,86 Dojima set the closing price for the day, and accord-

settled contracts through market power manipulation by squeezing the commodity used to
determine the value of the contract).
82. Craig Pirrong argues that control of manipulation by the state might be desirable in
some circumstances. See Stephen Craig Pirrong, The Self-Regulation of Commodity Ex
changes: The Case ofMarket Manipulation, 38 J.L. & ECON. 141 (1995). But see Frank H.
Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation, and the Regulation of Futures Markets, 59 J. BUS
Sl03 (1986); Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit "Manipulation" in
Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503 (1991). Even if Pirrong is correct, Dojima dif
fers from the markets that Pirrong examines. The Dojima rules discussed herein (but per
haps not the practice) appear to differ from those of the Chicago Board of Trade and other
exchanges that Pirrong finds "took few, if any, actions to deter manipulation." Pirrong, su
pra, at 195. Pirrong also finds that effective self-regulation came about only after the advent
of federal commodity laws. See Pirrong, supra, at 192-95. Dojima rules changed little after
legal intervention. See infra text accompanying note 130.
Determining why Dojima rules differ from other markets - why traders adopted the
firebox system - is more difficult. Perhaps the answer lies in homogeneity. See Pirrong,
supra, at 158. But the degree of homogeneity of financial interests that existed among mer
chants, which comprised a very broad status group, is unclear at best, and the size of the ex
change points toward heterogeneity. See Pirrong, supra, at 162 (noting that enforcement is
lower when exchange membership is large). Perhaps the answer lies in the inability to cost
shift. Pirrong argues that consumers of exchange services may bear the bulk of costs of ma
nipulation, not exchange members. See Pirrong, supra, at 164. But while Dojima may have
had fewer external consumers than some modem markets, they did exist. See supra text ac
companying note 75. Perhaps a better answer is that the firebox system was adopted simply
to determine objectively a closing time, and its antimanipulation effects were an inadvertent
bonus.
83. See S. CRAIG PIRRONG ET AL., GRAIN FuruREs CONTRACTS: AN ECONOMIC
APPRAISAL 82-102 (1993).
84. See id. at 82.
85. The following description relies on SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 45-46, 107; SUGIE,
supra note 6, at 46; and SUZUKI, supra note 70, at 100-01.
86. See, e.g., FABOZZI ET AL., supra note 48, at 503.
.
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ingly the opening price for the following day, at a price representative
of trading when the fire went out. Sometimes the closing price was the
last trading price, but sometimes the last trades were ignored and offi
cials set the closing price at a general average based on preceding
trades.
If the Exchange could not determine a closing price, or if the wick
did not burn up completely, all trades for that day were declared void.
That day's opening price became the closing price, and consequently
the opening price for the next day. It was as if that trading day never
occurred. By way of example, in May 1762, due to a drought in the
southern island of Kyushu, futures prices rose from 55.8 monme of sil
ver on May 7 to 72 monme on May 29. The price of 72 was seen as in
credibly high, and traders stopped trading midday. Unable to find an
official closing price, all transactions for that day were voided, and the
next day's opening price was set at the previous day's closing price of

68 monme.1>1

Although the firebox system had its quirks (for instance, the Ex
change apparently would void a trading day even if rain extinguished
the fire),88 it played an important role in market management. Occa
sionally it created a ruckus, as on-a-roll traders had their assistants fan
the wick, and losers of the day tried to extinguish the flame.89 But
generally the firebox system appears to have been an effective method
of curbing abuses such as cornering or dumping. Made aware of a po
tential manipulation scheme, traders simply stopped trading. At the
end of the day, no closing price could be found, all transactions would
be voided, and the potential abuser would not profit. The system thus
encouraged mutual monitoring of trading activity.
It is possible that the firebox system may have also been used to
punish nonmanipulating traders. But no record of such behavior ex
ists, a fact possibly attributable to collective action problems in organ
izing a punitive strike. At the least, the mechanism does not suffer
from the unappealing qualities that arbitrary fixed position limits set
by outside enforcers sometimes do.

4.

Coalitions

Finally, in addition to the above rules, the geographical coalitions
that arose after 173090 discouraged abuses through reputational

87. See SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 46.
88. See id. at 43.
89. Exchange directors were once forced to issue an order to control related violence.
See BEISHO KYOKJ, supra note 41, at 3fJ7.

90. See supra text accompanying note 69.
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bonds.91 Merchants within a particular coalition would be unlikely to
cheat one another for fear of being barred from the coalition, which
would result in loss of livelihood. Likewise, merchants from other
coalitions would think twice about cheating a member of another coa
lition for fear of mass reprisal. Coalitions thus improved upon simple
intertrader reputation mechanisms by reducing the premium that mer
chants must pay to keep their trading partners honest.
C.

Why Rules?

In matters of both governance and abuse prevention, Dojima par
ticipants appear to have relied less heavily on informal reputational
monitoring and enforcement by market participants than on formal
monitoring and enforcement by the organization. Inter-trader reputa
tion certainly mattered, and the geographic coalitions surely facilitated
exploitation of intertrader reputational bonds. But the Exchange ap
pears to have addressed major problems of market organization and
efficiency primarily through formal constraints: rules, licenses, clear
inghouse institutions, and so on. Moreover, many of the longstanding
trading and governance rules and practices existed at least fifty years
before the rise of coalitions, suggesting that rules reliant on organiza
tional, rather than individual, monitoring of reputation may have been
more important at Dojima than in other (largely) self-regulating
groups. At least three reasons suggest why Dojima relied on rules to
the extent that it did.
First, in some cases, such as the trader licensing system, Dojima
participants had no choice between rules and inter-trader reputation,
as the state mandated the decision. Participants might have preferred
an internally devised membership constraint that might have led to
greater reliance on reputational bonds, but they were not given the
option. Indeed, they actually formulated some of their own internal
licensing requirements that were ultimately co-opted by the state.
Second, as Lisa Bernstein notes in her analysis of the cotton indus
try, reputation may be more important in industries in which grading
of goods is difficult.92 Because rice could easily be graded by geo
graphic origin,93 it may have been more easily subject to relatively
rigid internal rules. Were rice as difficult to grade as diamonds, per
haps intertrader reputational constraints would have been more im
portant.
91. See Avner Grief, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade:
The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993); Paul R. Milgrom et al.,
The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the
Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. & POL. 1 (1990).
92 See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Value Creation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2001).
93. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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Finally, unlike many of the other self-regulated commercial mar
kets analyzed in the law and economics literature, participants at
Dojima did not choose to opt out of the legal system. Given the
choice, they might have preferred shogunate-imposed rules and sup
port. But while the shogunate's 1730 edict explicitly adopted many
existing Dojima institutions, it forced participants themselves to or
ganize many aspects of the Exchange, including governance and dis
pute resolution mechanisms.94
III. MARKET PERFORMANCE

How effective were Dojima institutions in reducing transaction
costs and establishing an ordered market? In some studies of self
regulating commercial markets, a lack of data forces analysts into rela
tively ad hoc conclusions: private ordering in such markets is efficient
because long-lasting; were it inefficient, these markets would not exist.
The argument applies here as well - the Exchange is unlikely to have
been terribly inefficient, given its long history and high trading volume
for such an extended period of time.
But fortunately, Dojima provides relevant data, which offer more
precise alternatives than mere longevity, but not necessarily less as
sailable conclusions, for judging efficiency. For at least three genera
tions, the House of Tamao, located in Shiga Prefecture near Kyoto,
kept price records for various early modem Japanese rice markets in
the form of a thirteen-volume Market Price Diary (Mansoba Nikki).
From these brush-stroke manuscripts, historian Mieko Tsuruoka com
piled a list of spot prices for various rice markets and futures prices for
Dojima for the continuous period beginning in 1755 and ending in
1827; she then published it as an attachment to her 1972 article in a
publication as obscure as its title suggests: Department of Historical
94. The force-out nature of the Exchange and the rules and organization that resulted
may point to a difference among self-organized markets. Organizations that have the ability
to rely on relational bonds among market participants as more precisely tailored substitutes
for legal rules may be more likely than other organizations to opt out of the legal system.
But in force-out cases, organizations might not opt out of the legal system because the bind
ing propensity of relations is less significant. Relations might be less binding because the
group is less homogenous, because costs are significant, or because the transactions involved
are complex and rely more on an informed market than a relationally sound one. In these
instances, groups may be more likely to turn to rules, or organizational monitoring, to gov
ern their affairs. The opt-out/force-out dichotomy may help explain why "it is primarily the
fear of damage to reputation that maintains discipline in the diamond trade, not the bourse's
board of arbitrators" that governs diamond traders who "opt out" of the legal system,
Bernstein, supra note 1, at 152, just as close-knit groups like cattle ranchers and farmers in
Shasta County animal trespass rely on social norms, see Ellickson, supra note 1, while early
participants at the New York Stock Exchange relied on a "miniature legal system" that
"filled the void created by the unenforceability of time bargains in New York courts,"
Banner, supra note 1, at 132. Although Dojima traders were all members of the merchant
status group, that designation alone may have been insufficient to establish the requisite
bonds needed for inter-trader monitoring and a preemptive opt-out.
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Documents Research Bulletin (Shiryi5kan Kenkyii Kiyo).95 Japanese
economists who have used portions of the Tsuruoka dataset have re
ported it to be reliable.96 But because the dataset omits brief periods, I
examined the manuscripts directly to confirm the dataset's accuracy.
My examination led to changes in two price entries (one omission and
one apparent transposition of figures) and the addition of two missing
prices.
The Tsuruoka dataset lists prices at approximately two-week inter
vals but does not contain specific entries for one important category:
opening and closing prices for each term in the trimester system. The
only available source for such data canvasses a comparatively shorter
period of time. In September 1762, the House of Kashiwahara in
Osaka published "Ancient and Modern Rice Price Chart" (Kokon
Hachimoku Si5bachi5)91 in which it listed annual opening and closing
prices, as well as occasional annual trading volume data from 1724 to
1762. Although these data improve over the course of the period,
even the data from better years are too sparse to be statistically useful.
But the Appendix (Di5tsuiki5) to that volume, published in 1781 by the
House of Fuji,98 contains similar data from more regular intervals
(monthly rice bill volume data and opening and closing prices for each
term) from 1763 to 1780. In his 1970 collection of Dojima source ma
terials, historian Tokuichi Shimamoto reprinted these House of Fuji
opening and closing prices.99 Once again, I confirmed the accuracy of
the dataset by examining a copy of the original manuscript housed in
the Mitsui Archives and found only minor discrepancies. I added
these data to the Tsuruoka dataset.
95. Mieko Tsuruoka, Otsu Kokurui Sonata Sobahyo [Chart of Grain and Other Com
modity Prices in Otsu], attached to Kinsei Beikoku torhiki Shijo toshite no Otsu [Otsu as a
Tokugawa Rice Market], 5 SHIRYOKAN KENKYO KIYO 19, 114-207 (1972). The Bulletin was
at the time administered by the Ministry of Education but now by the National Institute of
Japanese Literature.
96. See MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 365; Ito, supra note 6, at 343; Wakita, supra note 6,
at 241. To my knowledge, these three works, all in Japanese, are the only formal economic
analyses of Dojima that exist. Each uses the Tsuruoka dataset. Miyamoto uses the entire
dataset, but his examination focuses on the Exchange's efficiency relative to each shogun's
reign and to currency valuation, and does not acknowledge the bias presented by the closed
trimester system, providing results that Ito bluntly calls "meaningless." Ito, supra note 6, at
345. Ito uses Tsuruoka data, but only for the period from 1763 to 1780, and only to fill in
gaps between closing dates. Wakita uses a fuller set, from 1760 to 1811, but his focus is sea
sonal variation.
97. Hachimoku is an early modem word for rice. See Kahei no Sanpomichi [Currency
Walking Tour], INSTITUIE FOR MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, BANK OF JAPAN, ch.
16, available at http://imes.boj.or.jp/cm/htmls/feature_l6.htm. Some sources, both English
and Japanese, occasionally mistransliterate the Japanese characters as "yagi," the surname
that uses the same characters.
98. See generally Tsuruoka, supra note 95, at 113.
99. See Hachimoku Sobachii TsuikO [Rice Price Appendix]; TOKUICHI SHIMAMOTO,
DOJIMA KOME KAIJO BUNKENSHO (COLLECTED DOJIMA RICE EXCHANGE SOURCE
MATERIALS] 1-37 (1970).
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To these data I added the occasional prices listed in the Rice Trade
Chronicle (Beisho Kyiiki), recorded from 1616 to 1870. As in all em
pirical studies, more data would be preferable, but by adding these
prices to the combination of the Tsuruoka (House of Tamao) and
Shimamoto (House of Fuji) datasets, I have compiled the most com
plete database of Dojima prices ever assembled. Except where other
wise noted, the remainder of this Part, including all figures, is based on
this database.
In this Part, I use the database to examine two simple efficiency
related questions. First, how closely do spot and futures prices corre
late and what factors affect that correlation? Second, what happens to
that correlation at the end of a trading term?100 Unfortunately, insuffi
cient data exist to determine the market's informational efficiency the degree to and speed with which its prices reflect publicly available
information - through an event study or similar methodology. The
scarcity of the available data may also yield differing interpretations.
But with those caveats, the following tests of the data can still provide
insight into whether Dojima functioned in accordance with modem
efficient market theory.
A.

Correlation ofSpot and Forwards (Futures) Prices

Traders use futures to reduce risk by hedging - counterbalancing
activities in the market for physical goods to protect themselves
against price movements. If spot prices (the price of current physical
goods) and futures prices (the price of forward-contract goods) di
verge frequently, such risk-reduction measures may be uncertain and
difficult, and traders can only use futures prices for speculative excess.
If the Dojima Rice Exchange fulfilled its risk reduction function well
and was not merely a tool for speculation, spot prices and futures
prices should be highly correlated, with relatively smooth movements
during the trading term.
Contemporaneous accounts indicate that spot and futures prices
did indeed correlate. Consider a 1798 popular instruction manual the Tokugawa equivalent of How to Make a Million in the Market.
The book boasted a win rate of seventy to eighty percent and stated in
typically roundabout prose, "The rise and fall of the spot and book
prices appear different, but are the same; they appear the same, but
are different in their inner workings alone; they are the same differ
ence."101

100. As noted infra notes 108 and 112, Japanese economists have attempted to address
both questions, using smaller data sets and different tests, but obtaining similar results.
101. Master Kenikukan, Hachimoku Ryiinokan [Dragon Book ofRice] {1798), in TARO
ADACHI, TOKUGAWA JIDAI KEIZAI H!ROKU ZENSHO [COMPILATION OF SECRET
ECONOMIC RECORDS OFTIIB TOKUGAWA ERA) 371, 385 {1941).
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The data tend to confirm the accounts. Figure 1 shows the correla
tion between spot and futures prices during the period 1755-1827. As
theory predicts, price movements are smooth, and spot and forward
prices are correlated, with no major anomalies. The movements cor
respond favorably to those of modem futures markets.102
Rfµ'e 1: Price Carelaioo, 1755-1827
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The Exchange can also be examined by analyzing the spread be
tween spot and futures prices. Intuitively, one might expect futures
prices to exceed spot prices: because of carrying costs such as interest,
storage costs, and insurance, a buyer can purchase today one sack of
rice for less money than he can purchase the right to purchase that rice
in the future. When futures prices exceed spot prices, the situation is
termed "contango" or "normal carry," or, in eighteenth-century
Japanese, "upper margin" (uwazaya). But short-term price increases,
low carrying costs, and premiums paid by producers for the ability to
hedge their own anticipated supplies, can often result in higher spot
prices than futures prices, a situation known as "backwardation" or
"inverse carrying charge,m03 or, in eighteenth-century Japanese,
102 See, e.g., WALTER C. LABYS & C.WJ GRANGER, SPECULATION, HEDGING AND
COMMODITY PRICE FORECASTS 25-32 (1970); MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 365-85. The
trimester trading system, see supra text accompanying note 47, makes detailed empirical
comparisons of this measure with other futures markets difficult, if not impossible.
103. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Business Cycles and the Behavior of
Metals Prices, 53 J. FIN. 1075 (1988); Holbrook Working, Theory of the Inverse Carrying
Charge in Futures Markets, 30 J. FUTuRE ECON. 9 (1949). On the efficiency of Dojima as a
hedge institution, see Matao Miyamoto, Edo Jidai no Kome Shijo: Sono Koza to Kina [The
Stmcture and Function of Tokugawa Era Rice Markets], GENDAI KEIZAI, 48, 56-62 (Spring
1982).
.
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"lower margin" (shitazaya). Relative to the spot market, a futures
market is either in contango or backwardation.
Figure 2 shows
graphically the differences in the spot and futures prices for the same
period depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 2:
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Spot/Futures Pri ce Deviation: Contango and Backwardation
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Movements above zero indicate periods in which the futures price
exceeded the spot price, in other words, when the market is in con
tango. Movements below zero indicate backwardation. Some degree
of backwardation is not surprising; although transportation costs were
high, storage costs were relatively low.104 The market experienced pe
riods of both backwardation and contango, with the only major period
of extreme backwarda'tion occurring in 1787 during the Great Tenmei
Famine.105 The Famine, which began in 1783 and continued through
1787 as a result of flooding and volcanic eruption, drove short-term
spot prices much higher than futures prices and explains both the in
creased average backwardation and the large dip in that period.106
The lack of either lengthy or extreme periods of backwardation or
contango tentatively suggests that the market was suitable for hedging.
But because the long-term data are noisy and conclusions are difficult,
I have attempted to find clearer patterns. Recall that Dojima was a

104. See MIYAMOTO, supra note 6, at 190-91.
105. That the famine occurred at all may indicate the limited reach of the shogunate
government. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
106. Other large movements are more difficult to explain. The early 1762 contango oc
curred at about the same tinle that the shogunate offered financial assistance to at least one
rice brokerage suffering from low physical rice prices, perhaps due to excess supply. See
DOHI, supra note 6, at 206. Spot prices rose in mid-1762 due to the Kyushu drought. See
supra text accompanying note f!:/.

2602

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:2574

seasonal market with three distinct trading terms.107 Each year was di
vided into a spring term (January 8 - April 28), a summer term (May 7
- October 9), and a winter term (October 17 - December 24), and
traders were required to settle all contracts by the end of each term
when the market closed. To test whether market conditions may dif
fer in each term, I recalculated the data presented in Figure 2 by
month. Figure 3 represents the combined annual monthly averages of
those calculations.

Figure 3: Seasonal Price Changes
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The seasonal data reveal two interesting trends. First, the terms
are indeed distinct in the data, indicating that traders may have had
different concerns depending on the season. Second, as the figure
shows, futures prices were generally higher than spot prices in the
spring and fall markets, while the opposite was generally true in the
summer market. This trend may be an indication that (1) transporta
tion costs peaked in the fall, when rice arrived in Osaka after the har
vest, which could lead to higher futures prices, and (2) the summer
season, as an off-farming season that preceded the fall harvest, reflects
low transportation costs, more potential for short-term squeezes of
dwindling rice, and the payment of a premium by traders and suppliers
hedging against the uncertain incoming fall harvest.108

107. See supra text accompanying note 47.
108. See Wakita, supra note 6, at 243 (showing seasonal efficiency with a smaller dataset
by regressing the log of the spread against a seasonal dummy).
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End of Trading Term

All things being equal, spot and futures prices should converge as
the delivery date approaches and carrying costs decrease to near zero.
In most markets, which have continuous seasons and multitudinous
contracts with differing delivery dates, this relationship is difficult, if
not impossible, to analyze empirically.109 But the trimester system at
Dojima makes exposition of the theory possible like virtually no other
market. In short, no matter how significantly spot and futures prices
deviate from one another during the trading period, they should con
verge at the end of a term because futures contracts cannot extend be
yond that point. Intuitively, the value of a forward contract for rice
today should equal the value of rice bought on the market today.U0
Again, contemporaneous evidence of this phenomenon at Dojima
exists. As economic philosopher Banto Yamagata observed in 1802:
The blood of this world is the book transaction system, and the spot price
and the book price are like day and night, working together and not
against each other. Though the prices diverge, at the end of April,
October, and December, the spot and book price are the same; they be
come the same blood.111

The data tend to confirm Yamagata's observation.112 Market
opening and closing date price data are available for the period 17631780. Because a single chart covering that period would provide insuf
ficient detail, I instead present data graphically for three years: one in
the beginning (1764), one in the middle (1773), and one at the end
(1780) of that period. The remaining years exhibit the same trend as
these years, presented in Figures 4, 5, and 6.

109. See PIRRONG ET AL., supra note 83, at 15-16.
110. The data in Section III.A are biased toward higher correlation because of this phe
nomenon, but the monthly correlations show the same general trend even in the absence of
term-ending months.
111. Banta Yamagata, Yume no Shiro [The Stuff of Dreams] (1802), in TOMINAGA

NAKAMOTO, yAMAGATA BANTO 141, 398 (Norihisa Mizuta et al. eds., 1973).

112. Ito conducts a sinillar test for different periods using a smaller dataset. See Ito, su
pra note 6, at 343.
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Figure 4: Price Movements, 1764
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Figure 5: Price Movements, 1773
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In each period, as the figures show, if one did not know the exact
closing date, finding the poi.Ilt at which spot'prices and forward prices
converge would serve as a good indicator. In each period, the market
performed as theory predicts - although prices varied during the
course of the trading period, the lack of carrying costs ensured that
they converge at the end of each period.
Aggregate data tend to confirm the results of the individual period
data. For the period 1763-1780, I calculate the average difference in
closing prices to be .04 monme, and the average difference in non
closing prices to be .11 monme. In percentage terms, on average,
closing forward prices were a miniscule .07% higher than closing spot
prices, while non-closing forward prices were a full .35% higher. In
short, the data suggest that the market performed just as theory would
predict.
·

IV. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The data presented in Part III indicate that the Exchange per
formed the tasks of risk reduction and price discovery well and that its
prices accord with economic theories of market efficiency. In this
Part, I examine the murkier relationship between state regulation and
Exchange efficiency.
A.

The 1730 System

The 1730 shogunate decision to disallow suits over futures con
tracts113 was part of a broader legal and institutional plan. Although
crossover occurred, the shogunate generally distinguished between
two types of suits: criminal proceedings (ginmisuji) and civil pro
ceedings (deirisuji).114 Civil proceedings were further divided into
three types: suits involving close relations (nakamagoto) ; "money
suits" (kanekuji), which were suits "based on unsecured money claims
upon which interest was charged;"�15 and "main suits" (honkuji), which
were claims based on general property rights and involved security.
The ability to sue in shogunate courts depended on the type of
proceeding, which in turn was determined by the relationship of the
parties. The shogunate prohibited suits involving close relations, spe
cifically excluding suits involving rotating credit associations, contracts
among several persons to start certain businesses, and controversies
arising from gate receipts at entertainment events such as plays and
sumo matches. In each case, the shogunate, because of the close rela
tionship among parties to such transactions (including the latter rela-

113. See supra text accompanying note 41.
114. See RYOSUKE ISHII, NIHON HOSEISHI GAISETSU, supra note 58, at 471.
115. Henderson, supra note 23, at 108.
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tionship between theater proprietors and money-backing producers),
withheld jurisdiction and forced parties to such private transactions to
solve their own disputes.116
The shogunate also distinguished between money suits and main
suits, the former being strictly limited by minimum amounts in contro
versy requirements and the constraint that damages be paid in install
ments rather than as a lump sum.117 Courts more liberally heard main
suits, namely those most likely to occur between strangers.
Potential explanations for these distinctions might be the elimina
tion of court congestion, paucity of judicial resources, or the shogu
nate's lack of real regulatory power within the federalist system.
These factors likely were real concerns. But the shogunate's policy of
tying enforceability to relation-based criteria, along with its broad
policy of coalition establishment in other contexts, supports the claim
of several Japanese legal and economic scholars who suggest an addi
tional reason why the shogunate limited suits: to encourage the pri
vate resolution of problems that might arise from merchant con
tracts.118 By requiring private dispute resolution, the shogunate may
have hoped to provide incentives for parties to develop efficient rules
and norms to avoid disputes, thus spurring economic growth through
market development without expending government resources.119
As with other relationship-based transactions, the state prohibited
suits at Dojima altogether. Forced out of the legal system, the Ex
change had to develop dispute resolution institutions on its own. Un
fortunately, little has been recorded about the specifics of Dojima dis
pute resolution.
Exchange directors appointed a conciliation
committee, which apparently had broad powers to resolve disputes,
and promulgated rules largely on an individual basis with nominal re
gard to internal precedent.120

116. See RYOSUKE ISHII, KINSEi TORIHIKIHOsm [HISTORY OF EARLY MODERN
COMMERCIAL LAW] 52-58 (1982). On ten occasions in the Tokugawa period (about every
twenty years, and four times after the Exchange's founding, in 1746, 1789, 1797, and 1843),
the shogunate issued orders (aitaisumashirez) refusing to hear all credit-related suits. See id.
at 15-49.
117. See RYOSUKE ISHII, NIHON HOSEISIIl GAISETSU, supra note 58, at 527, 529-30.
118. See TETSun OKAZAKI, Eno NO SHJJO KEIZAI: REKISIIl SEIDO BUNSEKI KARA
MITA KABUNAKAMA [MARKET ECONOMICS OF Eno: COALITIONS THROUGH THE LENS
OF HISTORICAL SYSTEM ANALYSIS] 76 {1999); see also MATAn MIYAMOTO,
KABUNAKAMA NO KENKYO [STUDY OF COMPANION SHARES] 21-33 {1938); OISHI, supra
note 71.
119. See ISHII, supra note 116, at 52-58; OKAZAKI, supra note 118, at 76.
120. See BEISHO KYDKI, supra note 41, at 105 {discussing provisions for dealing with
rule violators); ISHII, supra note 116, at 52-58; OKAZAKI, supra note 118, at 76; see also
DIAMOND & KOLLAR, supra note 8, at 7-8.
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The 1773 System

In February 1773, the commissioner of Osaka, a shogunate official
with broad administrative and judicial powers,121 issued a decree in
which he reversed Yoshimune's 1730 edict122 by agreeing to hear fu
tures-related suits on designated "suing days."123 If a plaintiff proved
his case, the shogunate would pay damages to the plaintiff and collect
the judgment from the defendant.124 Dojima traders could thus choose
between state and internal dispute resolution mechanisms.
There are at least four plausible theories as to why the decree was
issued. First, the government may have thought it was responding to a
need for dispute settlement services that the Exchange was not pro
viding adequately. Second, one scholar surmises that the shogunate
sought to increase trading volume and control of the Exchange in gen
eral.125 Third, broader political motives may have been responsible for
the decree. The policies of shogun Tanuma (1719-1788) were re
markably different from those of the "rice shogun" Yoshimune, whose
1730 edict legalized Dojima trading. Tanuma intervened in a variety
of markets, including Dojima, to gain greater control for the govern
ment over macroeconomic conditions.126 Finally, the shogunate may
have desired to control the Exchange in order to limit the power of
nouveaux riche Dojima merchants who were owed great debts by
status-superior samurai.127
The 1773 edict was short-lived. The shogunate discontinued the
system in November 1784, and the government once again removed

121. Unlike the Edo commissioner, which apparently was largely a civil administration
organ, the Osaka commissioner was charged with the administration of justice, including the
powers to legislate and hear suits.
See GENTARO HARUHARA, OSAKA NO
MACHIBUGYOSHO TO SAIBAN [LAWSUITS AND THE OSAKA TOWN COMMISSION] 11 (1962).
The Osaka commissioner had crintinal investigative powers as well, but often relied on pri
vate enforcement. See YOSHII Fum, OSAKA MACHIBUGYO TO KEIBATSU [CRIMINAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE OSAKA TOWN COMMISSIONER] 73, 83 (1990).
122 See supra text accompanying note 41.
123. See BEISHO KYDK:r, supra note 41, at 177 (1971); 0FUREGAKI TENMEI SHOSEI
[COMPILATION OF TENMEI PERIOD ORDINANCES (1781-1789)] 835 (Shinzo Takayanagi &

Ryosuke Ishii eds., 1936); SAKUDO, supra note 12, at 370.

124. See SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 19. If a plaintiff had been forced to enforce the
judgment against the defendant, the best way to enforce a debt claint was said to be the hir
ing of "[g]angs of ruffians to beat up non-paying debtors." S1EENSTRUP, supra note 20, at
146; see also Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An
Institutional and Empirical Analysis ofOrganized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41 (2000).
125. See SAKUDO, supra note 12, at 370.
126. See generally CHARLES DAVID SHELDON, THE RISE OF THE MERCHANT CLASS IN
TOKUGAWA JAPAN 1600-1868, at 114-21 (1958).
127. See NAOTARO SEKIYAMA, NIHON KAHEI KIN'YDSHI KENKYD [A STUDY OF
JAPANESE CURRENCY FINANCIAL HISTORY] (1943).
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itself from Dojima dispute resolution.128 Beginning in 1785, traders re
turned to the pre-1773 status quo of settling all their own disputes.
It is difficult accurately to determine how many post-1773 suits
from Dojima actually reached shogunate courts. Table 2 offers the
best available solution by detailing the total number of suits of all
types heard by the Osaka commissioner:

TABLE 2:

LAWSUITS FILED WITH THE OSAKA COMMISSIONER
Year

Total Suits

1735
1736
1737

13,625
12,817
10,917

1782
1783
1784
1785
1786

*

*

*

20,201
27,868
24,159
16,285
13,278

SOURCE: GENTARO HARUHARA, O SAKA NO MACHIBUGYOSHO
TO SAIBAN [LAWSUITS AND THE O SAKA TOWN COMMISSION] 12-

13 (1962).

Both the accuracy of the data and the ability of these gross data
properly to reflect futures-specific suits naturally warrant a fair degree
of skepticism. But in general, the annual number of suits in the period
after the 1773 decree (allowing for a huge 45-year data gap) was not
dramatically higher than the number of suits in the period 1735-1737,
and some increase is to be expected in a period of growing commer
cialism and population expansion.129 Likewise, there is no surviving
evidence of any significant change in the use of the Exchange's con
ciliation mechanism.

128. See OFUREGAKI TENMEI SHOSEI [COMPILATION OF TENMEI PERIOD
ORDINANCES (1781-1789)], supra note 123, at 837-38. After September 1782, rice bills were
required to carry the seal of the commissioner's designated rice inspector, who settled dis
putes. See id.; see also SAKUDO, supra note 12, at 370; SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 20.
129. The impact of population on litigation rates in this case is ambiguous at best. The
most precise estimates measure the population of Osaka at 268,760 in 1635, 389,866 in 1736,
peaking at 419,863 in 1765, and gradually declining to 380,416 in 1785. See Osamu Wakita,
Kinsei Osaka Chiiki no Toshi to Noson [Farm Villages and Cities ofthe Early Modern Osaka
Region], in KINSEi OSAKA CHIIKI NO SHITEKI BUNSEKI (HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE

EARLY MODERN OSAKA REGION] 295, 304 (Osamu Wakita ed., 1980). Other sources place
the peak in the 1750s and at about 400,000. See, e.g., Dom, supra note 6, at 18. If Wakita's
figures are accurate, litigation rates in 18th-century Osaka (in 1785, about 43 suits per 1,000
population) were far higher than those in most contemporary United States jurisdictions.
See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 4 (1983).
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But note the sudden drop in suits in 1785 following the discontinu
ance of the shogunate dispute resolution system in 1784. Contempo
raneous accounts state that the system's 1784 discontinuance occurred
because the shogunate, with limited resources, was unable to keep up
with the demand for dispute resolution services.130 To the extent that
such accounts are correct, the shogunate's response is nonetheless in
teresting. Instead of devoting more governmental resources to the
pressing problem of solving disputes, the shogunate apparently aban
doned the system altogether.
The shogunate's abandonment of the system, the debatable ab
sence of a sustained increase in post-1773 litigation (to the extent sug
gested by the data), or both, might be explained by the quality of sho
gunate legal rules.
Like other Tokugawa coalitions, Dojima
"performed important functions for the Tokugawa economy as well,
the most important of which was the establishment of rules for mer
cantile practices. Because the government did not establish a body of
customary law to enforce business transactions, [coalitions] were
forced to do so by themselves."131 It is unclear the extent to which
shogunate courts would have applied customary law in trading cases at
the end of the eighteenth century. To the extent that shogunate courts
did not apply customary law and were thus less predictable than a
conciliation committee's application of Dojima internal rules,132 plain
tiffs would likely have preferred to bring suit in shogunate court only
in cases in which the Dojima conciliation committee would have ruled
against them.133 To the extent that Tokugawa courts did apply cus
tomary law (as they often did in commercial cases ),134 assuming that
they applied it the same way as private courts, trader disputants would
likely be no better off in court than before the exchange conciliation
committee. Perhaps some traders rationally preferred to rely on fa
miliar private internal institutions rather than public legal ones with
which they had little experience. Perh�ps some traders could receive
more favorable judgments in one court than another, perhaps because
of institutional factors, or perhaps because the systems were rigged
one way or another. Whatever the case, while it may generally be
130. See OFUREGAKI TENMEI SHOSEI [COMPILATION OF TENMEI PERIOD
ORDINANCES (1781-1789)], supra note 123, at 837-38; see also SAKUDO, supra note 12, at

370.

131. Matao Miyamoto, The Development of Business Associations in Prewar Japan, in

TRADE ASSOCIATIONS IN BUSINESS HISTORY 7 (Hiroaki Yamazaki & Matao Miyamoto
eds., 1988); see also OKAZAKI, supra note 118;

132. Dan Henderson finds that the general philosophy of Tokugawa courts was that
"[r]eason is significantly superior to customary law." HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 58-59.
133. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). In the Japanese context, see J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU
NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 92-95 (1999).
134. See, e.g., OKAZAKI, supra note 118, at 71.
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preferable for public lawmakers to provide default rules rather than
mandatory ones,135 giving plaintiffs a forum-shopping option at
Dojima likely reduced the predictability of dispute resolution.
C.

Comparing the Two Systems

The shogunate announced and implemented its reverse-course de
cision to allow suits based on trading at Dojima on designated "suing
days" in 1773. If privately ordered internal rules were functioning ef
ficiently, the decision should not have drastically altered market ar
rangements. Although the effect on litigation rates is unclear, market
institutions remained intact after 1773. The discontinuance of the
edict after only twelve years also calls into question the efficacy of the
shogunate courts. We can also look to five more precise measures to
determine the effect of the decree: price trends, trading volume, spot
futures correlation, volatility, and price.136
First, it is useful simply to eyeball 1773 price changes, as shown in
Figure 5 above (Section III.B). 1773 appears to be a relatively normal
year, with relatively normal price fluctuations and price convergence
at the end of each trading period. It also corresponds to the average
seasonal price changes depicted in Figure 3.
Second, I attempted to compare trading volume for the pre-edict
period and the edict period. Trading volume should give some general
indication of the extent to which the shogunate's decision increased
trading efficiency - traders might be less likely to trade in an ineffi
cient market.137 Volume data listing either actual amount of rice
traded at Dojima or the number of contracts traded at regular inter
vals are not available. But as a substitute, for the period from 1763 to
1780, the House of Fuji manuscript lists on a monthly basis the num
ber of bales (each about two bushels) of rice on which Osaka ware
houses initially issued rice bills.138
Admittedly, there are problems with using bill issuance as a proxy
for volume. Because many rice receipts bore no relation to the issuing
warehouse's actual inventory, Dojima traders effectively traded con
tracts, not rice, and accordingly measuring the size of rice bills may be
somewhat artificial. Second, some of these rice bills were merely un
backed bonds not traded at Dojima. Still, assuming that these factors

135. See Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1752
(1996).
136. The latter two variables I examine at the suggestion of Omri Yadlin. An event
study to calculate abnormal returns based on the 1773 edict would be probative, but the data
are too scarce for such a study.
137. Of course, because ofDojima's futures trading monopoly, the only legal alternative
to futures trading at Dojima is not trading futures.
138. Average = 3,797,840; standard deviation = 293,081.2.
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remained relatively constant during the period in question, the data
might still provide some general hints as to whether and how Ex
change trading volume was affected by the edict. Figure 7 shows the
annual totals of rice bills issued by volume as recorded in the House of
Fuji manuscript.

Figure 7: Size of Rice Bills Issued (Trading Volume)
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During the pre-edict period (1763-1772), in which traders solved
their own disputes, warehouses wrote rice bills for an annual average
of 3,883,891 bales of rice.139 During the time of the edict in which fu
tures contracts were enforceable (beginning in 1773 and ending with
the end of data in 1780), rice bill volume fell to 3,690,276 bales of rice,
a drop of nearly five percent, and never once climbed above 4 mil
lion.140 But if the pre-edict period of comparison is not 1763-1772, but
the shorter period 1768-1772, the edict actually brought about a 3.6%
increase and volume of 3,800,000 bales for the first time in four years.
These findings would tend to support claims of efficient regulation.
The data are so noisy, however, that it is difficult to come to a firm
conclusion regarding the effect of the edict on volume measures.
Third, I compared the annual average correlations of spot and fu
tures prices. As Section III.B suggests, correlations are biased up
ward, as prices converge at the end of each term, but this calculation
should nevertheless provide a comparative measure of how useful fu
tures were as a hedging device before (1761-1772), during (1773-1784),
and after (1785-1796) the edict. As Table 3 shows, the average annual
correlation between spot and forward prices was greater during the

139. Standard deviation = 305,362.1.
140. Standard deviation = 254,788.7.
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pre-edict period than during the period in which the edict was en
forced.
TABLE 3: EDICT PERIOD COMPARISONS

Legal Status141
Pre-Edict:
Dojima Courts
Edict Shogunate and Dojima
Courts
Post-Edict
Dojima Courts

Volume
3,883,891

Bales

3,690,276

Bales

Unavailable

Annual Average
Correlation of
Spot and Futures Prices

Spot

Futures

Spot

Futures

.912

.06516

.06149

61.478

61.121

.883

.06702

.06207

57.755

57.480

.754

.06615

.06053

67.790

65.402

Price

Volatility

Of course, factors other than the edict may have been responsible
for the lower correlation of spot and futures prices, and the correlation
in the pre-edict period may have been so high that there was little
room for increase by the edict. Thus, while interesting that the best
measure of the price discovery function did not increase during the pe
riod in which contracts were legally enforceable, the analysis is at best
uncertain.
Fourth, I compared the volatility of spot and futures prices before,
during, and after the edict, by calculating the standard deviation of
logarithmic price differences, or geometric returns.142 The results of
annual average log-volatility calculations for the three periods are re
ported in Table 3.143 As the table shows, the differences among the

141. For volume, the periods are pre-edict 1763-1772 and edict 1773-1780, as limited by
the available data. For correlation, volatility, and price, I used equal eleven-year periods:
pre-edict 1761-1772, edict 1773-1784, and post-edict 1785-1796. Using the full dataset for
these periods results in pre-edict {1755-1772) correlation of .924 and post-edict (1785-1827)
correlation of .807. Removing the Great Tenmei Famine period raises the edict period cor
relation to .898 and the post-edict correlation to .817. Using the full dataset for volatility
results in pre-edict (1755-1772) log-volatility of spots .06286 and futures .06061, and post
edict log-volatility of spots .08404 and futures .07954. Using the full dataset for price results
in a pre-edict (1755-1772) average spot price of 60.911 and average futures price of 61.367,
and a post-edict (1785-1827) spot price of 61.364 and futures price of 61.034.
142. Standard deviation, which I mistakenly reported in an early draft of this Article, is
an inappropriate and inaccurate measure of volatility because, among other things, it as
sumes a normal price distribution in which negative prices could exist. See Glyn A. Holton,
Time: The Second Dimension ofRisk, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov./Dec. 1992, at 38.
143. Because these figures may be affected by the Great Tenmei Famine (1783-1787), I
also calculated log-volatilities designating the edict period as ending in 1782, and designating
the post-edict period as beginning in 1788. The figures for the 1773-1782 period are spots,
.06705; futures, .06178. The figures for the 1788-1827 period are spots, .07977; futures,
.07484. I also calculated volatility at five-year intervals, with the following results: 1768·
1772, spots, .06456; futures, .05903; 1773-1777, spots, .07015; futures, .06604; 1778-1782, spots,
.07377; futures, .07167.
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periods are small and insignificant, suggesting that the edict did not re
sult in a more stable market.144 Still, the correlation to the edict period
does not necessarily indicate causation.
Finally, I compared average prices before, during, and after the
edict. As seen in Table 3, spot and futures prices were lower during
the edict than in the period before and after. How exactly to interpret
that fact is unclear. Regardless of economic efficien�y, high rice prices
might indicate that the shogunate accomplished its stated goal of rais
ing those prices, while low prices might suggest policy failure.145 But
price differences may have been attributable to several complex fac
tors, including lower risk or increased rice supply. One likely explana
tion is simply that prices were lower during the period for a wide range
of goods, and rice was no exception. The House of Mitsui kept de
tailed records for much of the relevant period of consumer good
prices, including rice, soy bean paste, soy sauce, sake, and lamp oil in
Kyoto, the former capital city located about 25 miles from Dojima.146
Using these House of Mitsui data, E.S. Crawcour and Kozo
Yamamura calculated a price index for the contiguous period 17731817.147 Although the data are not equally complete for all commodi
ties, this Kyoto price index indicates a steep decline in average prices
from 1773 to 1783. 1780 and 1781 index prices were the lowest in the
entire dataset, and edict years represent five of the six lowest rice
prices in the dataset. Not surprisingly, regression analysis indicates a
statistically significant relationship between futures prices and the
Kyoto price index (r = .650, t 2.02, p .048).
In short, there is no strong evidence that allowing suits in shogu
nate courts had a positive impact on various measures of market per
formance. Nor is there strong evidence of adverse consequences of
state intervention. My hunch - and given the nature of the data it is
difficult to offer substantially more - is that the combination of public
and private dispute resolution mechanisms was not as good as, and
certainly no better than, the private one. I find that conclusion mar
ginally more persuasive given the data, and two fora for dispute reso
lution are likely to be less predictable than one. Moreover, as David
Chamy argues, legal intervention can improve transactors' welfare
when transactors have limited information, or when the law enforces
terms that transactors would have placed into contracts in the absence
=

=

144. See generally Robert J. Shiller, The Use of Volatility Measures in Assessing Market
Efficiency, 36 J. FIN. 291 (1981).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
146. See KINSEI KOKI NI OKERU SHUYO BUKKA NO DOTAI [MOVEMENTS OF MAJOR
COMMODITY PRICES DURING THE LATE TOKUGAWA PERIOD] 68-72 (Nobuhiko Nakai ed.,
1952).
147. See Crawcour & Yamamura, supra note 60, at 27-28.
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of high drafting costs.148 While I acknowledge the inherent circularity
here of theory and empirics, it is at least clear that whatever problems
Dojima traders may have faced, they did not appear to face problems
of limited information or high drafting costs in those areas of at
tempted state regulation.149 Little changed in either Dojima contracts
or Dojima institutions after 1773,150 suggesting that whatever informa
tional or drafting problems traders may have had, making contracts
legally enforceable did not solve them.

CONCLUSION
Most commercial markets and institutions of the Tokugawa feudal
period did not survive the 1868 Meiji Restoration that began shortly
after Japan was opened to the West. Increased foreign goods and for
eign traders, as well as increased production of Japanese goods for
foreign markets, disrupted long-established trading patterns. The
Osaka economy was "in turmoil," financial institutions dissolved, and
currency value was uncertain.151 In 1869, the new imperial government
abolished the Dojima Rice Exchange and all other "transactions in
differences," which it now labeled gambling, as had been done in the
West.152
But as in seventeenth-century Japan, early eighteenth
century England, and late eighteenth-century New York, nineteenth
century Japanese rice merchants continued to trade secretly in the ab
sence of law. In 1871 the government granted a petition submitted by
traders to reopen the market.153 Dojima subsequently continued as a
quasi-governmental organization (1881-1887), and then as a for-profit
corporation that charged its members dues (1887-1939),154 until war
time controls forced Dojima to cease operation. All that remains of
the Exchange today is a monument that, appropriately enough, re
sembles a gravestone.
At the hands of government bureaucrats, Dojima died a somewhat
ungraceful death. But for nearly 300 years, it remained a central insti148. See Charny, supra note 5, at 433-35; see also Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5;
Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Nonns, with Special Refer
ence to Sanctions, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 381 (1999).
149. Perhaps state laws to address issues not addressed well by traders, such as nation
wide trading or long-term contracting, might have been more successful.
150. See, e.g., SHIMAMOTO, supra note 6, at 1.
151. See MASAYUKI TSUGAWA, OSAKA DOJIMA KOME SHOKAUO NO KENKYO [A
STUDY OFTHE DOJIMA RICE MARKET] 6-26 (1990).
152. Zensaku Sano & Sentaro Iura, Commodity Exchanges in Japan, 155 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 223, 228 (1931).
153. See, e.g., yAMATANE GROUP KlNEN SHUPPANKAI, supra note 31, at 130-31.
154. See OSAKA DOJIMA SHOKAUO KlSOKU [OSAKA DOJIMA RICE MARKET RULES] 2
(Kuninlatsu Miyamoto ed., 1880), microformed on 4DM48902 (capitalized at 75,000 yen with
750 shares and formally established officers); Sano & Iura, supra note 152, at 225, 230.
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tution of the Japanese economy. Whatever problems Dojima may
have had, it was apparently efficient enough to squelch strong de
mands for reorganization. As this Article has shown, one of the rea
sons for its success - whether measured solely by longevity or by the
more formal methods detailed herein - was likely its system of pri
vately ordered rules and organizational constraints. The shadow of
the law was always present. But anecdotal information and price data
indicate that Dojima functioned for centuries in accordance with mod
em theories of efficient markets without direct government interven
tion or strict regulation. The data from the shogunate's 1773 experi
ment in public dispute resolution are more ambiguous, but they
certainly do not present a strong case for government intervention.

